

Position Paper
Towards a More Visionary and Participatory Eastern Partnership

4 May 2015

Ahead of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga and in light of the current European Neighbourhood Policy Review, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) delivers its key message to decision-makers to stay true to the universal values and engage society in building a common peaceful and prosperous future of the region. The EaP CSF believes that the Eastern Partnership Initiative has built an unprecedented level of rapprochement and common cooperation agenda for the benefits of citizens across Europe.

Building on this cooperation framework, the EaP CSF sees the need for the revised European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern dimension to **focus on getting society on board a more visionary, engaging and purposeful framework.**

KEY MESSAGES

Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum calls on the EU to:

1) Build a partnership based on universal values and work towards deliverables:

- Recognise the right of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to apply for **EU membership in the long term**, following progress of adopting EU *acquis* - see the [Joint Statement of EaP CSF National Platforms](#) calling on the EU to recognise their countries' membership perspective at the Riga Summit;
- Approve **visa-free travel** for Georgia and Ukraine once all the technical requirements have been met;
- Recognise the **contributions of civil society to monitoring** and advocating for continuous reform and state-building in the challenging times;
- Carefully **differentiate between AA/DCFTA countries** by strengthening practical support and monitoring reform implementation by setting more clear indicators and using the more-for-more principle;
- Strengthen **practical support to countries implementing AA/DCFTA agreements** and monitoring of the reform implementation by setting more clear indicators and using the more-for-more principle;
- Ensure a common EaP trajectory and **support reform-minded actors**, especially in countries which have not/do not intend to sign AA/DCFTA.

2) Embrace, empower and engage civil society:

- Invest in **development of civil society** and civil dialogue mechanisms at all levels;
- Facilitate civil society participation in policy development, monitoring and awareness-raising through small global granting/re-granting schemes;

- Ensure participation of civil society in **EU-Belarus, EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Armenia bilateral dialogue**, set clear monitoring indicators and provide feedback to civil society input;
- Enhance **support to reform-minded activists** in countries with authoritarian regimes and condition cooperation on immediate release of political prisoners;
- Build **viable AA/DCFTA civil society monitoring platforms** recognising the special contribution of civil society to the process and respecting national reality.

3) Improve ownership, engage society and build capacity for communicating EU values:

- Develop a **communication plan to highlight benefits** of cooperation and integration with the EU;
- Invest in **people-to-people initiatives** and EU-focused academic and training programmes for public servants and civil society;
- Develop regional pilot initiatives on **awareness-raising and engagement programmes**;
- **Encourage EaP governments to financially support CSO** engagement in policy-making;
- **Increase the role of EU Member States** in implementation of EaP, building on successful initiatives;
- **Strengthen political party capacity-building** to ensure stability and progress;
- **Attract private sector, especially SMEs** in the rapprochement agenda.

4) Introduce a security dimension in the renewed EaP to strengthen country resilience to external challenges.

5) Build on the successful elements of the implementation mechanisms and strengthen peer learning and cross-region exchange.

Introduction

This position paper includes key messages of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) towards the Eastern Partnership Summit. It draws on the regional and national realities in the six EaP countries focusing on achievements, challenges and proposals to strengthen the policy for the coming period, in the framework of the current ENP review process. The proposals draw on the priorities and expert assessment of National Platforms and Working Groups of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, as well as on its members' contributions from both the EaP and EU member states.

The adoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the subsequent launch of the Eastern Partnership Initiative have created a dynamic multilateral and bilateral cooperation platform between EU and six of its neighbours to the East (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia Moldova, and Ukraine). Six years on, the Eastern Partnership Initiative (hereinafter EaP) has become the cooperation platform where an unprecedented number of policy and decision-makers, civil society representatives and citizens build a common peaceful and prosperous future.

Achievements six years on: institutionalisation of a dynamic multi-stakeholder cooperation framework

Despite Russian pressure in the region and direct warning against closer ties with the EU (including through military aggression on Ukraine) Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine have signed Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (AA/DCFTA) with the EU in 2014. These agreements spell out a detailed state-building and reform agenda for the coming years. Armenia has overhauled its initial objective but currently exploring possibilities for building a different type of partnership. Azerbaijan and Belarus have shown interest in cooperation with the EU in a limited number of areas.

A tangible achievement of what Eastern Partnership can deliver has been the visa-free travel to Schengen area that citizens of Moldova have been enjoying since 28 April 2014. Following this opening, Moldova has signed visa-free travel agreements with other countries which apply similar standards as the Schengen area, making the benefit all the more tangible for the citizens.

The implementation of the AA/DCFTA has launched a comprehensive reform process in key aspects of state-building that, if implemented to the letter, would create peaceful, resilient and prosperous Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Understanding the value of implementing such reforms, civil society in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus are keen on their states to adopt EU standards and regulations in as many areas of the *acquis communautaire* as possible.

The Heads of State and Government Summits, other high level meetings and EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly have served as a political benchmark, taking stock of the achievements and challenges and reinforcing the cooperation based on them. Furthermore, numerous sectorial cooperation initiatives across the four platforms, bringing public officers as well as civil society representatives together on both sides have resulted in many policy framework initiatives beneficial in all the areas that the EaP Platforms and Flagship Initiatives cover.

The establishment of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum has created a platform where civil society coordinates joint monitoring actions, expertise input, awareness-raising and advocacy initiatives at national, regional and European level, together with civil society representatives from EU member states. The Forum has also ensured civil society input to all the multilateral platforms, thematic meetings and dialogue fora on EaP, bringing expertise and flagging up areas where changes were slow or not efficient enough. The Forum members have played a particularly crucial role in communicating better the benefits of AA/DCFTA, in highlighting problematic reform areas, making expert contributions and getting society to support reform. The activity of the Forum through National Platforms has shown that a large number of the active pro-EU civil society organisations have associated themselves with the Platforms and are actively monitoring, providing expertise and advocating for approximation to the EU across the region.

In conclusion, while it is a complex mix of policy, capacity building and technical support, Eastern Partnership Initiative has been one of the most dynamic EU foreign policy areas with ambitious goals. The EaP CSF believes there are tangible achievements and a strong base that can take the Eastern Partnership to a more visionary and participative cooperation framework.

Challenges: lack of vision and a consistent EU commitment, deteriorating security environment, unclear benefits in the short-term and inadequate engagement with the wider population in EaP countries

The EaP and the EU have been through challenging economic and financial crisis that raised doubts in the Eastern Partnership countries on the value of undergoing painful reform processes with few immediate and even mid-term tangible results for the people. The leaders in the EaP countries and the EU have not managed to communicate clearly the link between the values and the practical, sometimes technical, dialogue in specific fields. Against a backdrop of constant anti-EU propaganda actively supported by Russia, population in EaP countries finds itself in a space of doubt. The fact that the dialogue with the EU remains largely at the policy-makers' level does not help clear this out. Some awareness-raising campaigns have been explaining the benefits of AA/DCFTA versus Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), against the background of a strong Russian position on what the EaP countries have a right to do, yet more information and engagement with the population is needed.

The EU has also toned down its messages regarding the ambition of the EaP, carefully withholding from emphasizing that a successful implementation of AA/DCFTA opens up the EU membership perspective in the long term for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. EU value base needs to remain at the core of the bilateral dialogue with all the EaP countries and society needs to be able to engage with this process more. While the European Parliament has been more forthcoming on the membership perspective issue, the EU and several EU Member States have preferred rather ambiguous formulations that the EaP societies striving to get closer to the EU do not appreciate and get discouraged to proceed further with painful reforms.

The Russian economic and political sanctioning of EU-aspiring states and its military aggression towards Georgia and then Ukraine, have also highlighted multiple vulnerabilities that the EaP and the EU are facing when the agreed international order is violated. Comprehensive reform of all military, paramilitary and other hard security areas along with soft security aspects such as energy security, security of the information space and of the right to impartial information, security of financial systems, combating corruption and de-politicisation of governance are some of the areas highlighted in the recent conflict. EaP CSF policy brief on security and other stakeholders' analysis have been showing the need for a hard and soft security dimension to be better spelled out in a renewed, pro-active Eastern Partnership Initiative, making it a more agile and resilient foreign policy tool. Even the political elites in EaP countries, many of whom are controlled by economic interest groups, realise that the debate on security has become unavoidable. The EU has been less coherent on the messages it sends to societies in EaP countries on these issues and this casts doubts over the trust people can put in this policy. EaP security framework is not properly linked to the European security at large (Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)).

Finally, the EaP has engaged civil society in all regional and many national processes early on. However, paradoxically, during this same period, civil society has been operating in very challenging environments, particularly in repressive conditions in Azerbaijan and Belarus. In spite of slight progress in countries which have signed AAs, overall there are still barriers to civil society development and meaningful engagement with EaP in the whole region. This indicates that electoral democracy is not fully in place and ruling elites focus on winning narrow margins through sometimes questionable reforms rather than through public engagement. This also highlights that the potential impact that civil society may have on the democratisation and development of EaP countries needs to be further strengthened.

We call on the EU and EaP decision-makers to reflect in the renewed Eastern dimension of the ENP, namely the Eastern Partnership Initiative, the following:

1) Build a partnership based on universal values and work towards deliverables

Strongly uphold the EU values in the renewed regional and bilateral cooperation initiatives, especially with countries with poor human rights record, political prisoners, selective justice and interference with the administration of law. A value-based partnership is crucial to making the next EaP a success. We call on the EU Institutions to ensure that **respect of human rights and freedoms becomes a pre-condition for political and economic dialogue**. This is still a big challenge for Europe, and the EU has a big role to play when reshaping its bilateral partnerships with EaP countries. As this paper is being published, two of the EaP CSF members¹ have received heavy prison sentences in Azerbaijan, strengthening further our call for value-based cooperation.

We call on the EU, at this critical time of political instability in the Eastern Neighbourhood, to reiterate a **clear membership perspective for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine** – as it is referenced in the Association Agreements². It has also been recognised in the EP and EURONEST resolutions³, and it is of utmost importance to reconfirm this signal from the EU Council at the Riga Summit. Such an affirmation will highlight the commitment and strengthen population support for much-needed implementation of AA/DCFTA agenda.

The EU should support full implementation and approve **visa-free travel for Georgia and Ukraine** (granted to Moldova in 2014) upon completion of the second phase of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans.

The EU should strengthen its **support to Georgia, Moldova, and especially to Ukraine** with a careful differentiation to make AA/DCFTA agreements a success in the next phase of ENP/EaP implementation. Some tools should be adjusted to provide immediate support for stabilizing Ukraine and practically supporting the reform-minded groups in these three countries to pressure their political elites for real progress and avoiding simulation.

¹ EaP CSF Statement Demanding Immediate and Unconditional Release of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan, <http://eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/steering-committee-demands-immediate-and-unconditional-release-of-all-political-prisoners-in-azerbaijan/>

² Joint Statement of EaP CSF National Platforms calling on EU to recognise the membership perspective of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, <http://eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/national-platforms-eastern-partnership-countries-need-eu-membership-perspective/>

³ European Parliament resolution of 17 April 2014 (2014/2699 (RSP)), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-0457&language=EN&ring=P7-RC-2014-0436>

European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 (2013/2149 (INI)), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0229+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

The reviewed ENP/EaP should offer **enhanced practical support and monitoring of real reform implementation** under AA/DCFTA to avoid simulation of pro-EU activities observed in the past⁴. Benchmarking instruments such as scoreboards allowing AA EaP countries to compare progress with each other would be a useful approach. It is important to set more concrete indicators so that civil society monitoring can be more focused and contribute better to the evaluation process. The EU annual reports should assess concrete benchmarks and indicators set for a specific time period, and civil society should be invited to contribute to this process. Feedback on civil society input must also be provided to make the reform process more participatory and transparent.

The support can be provided through concrete mechanisms such as Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) and conditionality-based sectorial reform agreements as well as the five flagship initiatives. The CIB programme should be strengthened, building on the “more for more” approach of enhanced support, including political support, for those countries that achieve demonstrable reforms⁵.

The monitoring and oversight of spending of the EU support in the EaP countries should become stricter, including the scrutiny by the civil society, and shortcomings in legal regulation or political climate in countries which can undermine efficient use of the EU funding including budgetary support should be born in mind⁶. The EaP CSF calls on the EU not to tolerate any attempts of mismanagement, as such practices increase mistrust in cooperation with EU and allow political elites to avoid accountability.

Despite the different tracks the EaP countries have taken in their bilateral relations and involvement with multilateral EaP cooperation framework, we believe that the EU should continue to offer incentive for a **common EaP trajectory**, hence offering a space for engagement and peer learning for reform-minded groups in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. These groups are few value-based allies the EU has in these countries and their support is critical. Besides universal values, such as respect for human rights and the rule of law, toward which the attitude of some governments may be sceptical, there are development issues less likely to be rejected (SME, research and innovation,

⁴Hrant Kostanyan, the Vilnius Summit on course for success: but the real work on the Eastern Partnership is yet to come. CEPS European Neighbourhood Watch, Issue n. 96, August-September 2013, www.ceps.eu/system/files/simplenews/2011/05/NWatch96.pdf

O. Shatberashvili, Innovation Processes and Good Governance: Opportunities within the Framework of Eastern Partnership Initiative. Chapter 11. Conclusion of the book: EU Eastern Partnership Programme and Prospects for Innovative Development of Georgia, Josef Gogodze, Ed., Association ESIDG, Tbilisi, 2011, pp. 12-48. (in Georgian). Translation available at ESIDG, www.inovdev.ge

⁵ European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership countries 2014, www.eap-index.eu

⁶ EaP CSF's comparative report on the use of budget support as a tool for fostering reform to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, <http://eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/transparency-and-strategic-planning-needed-in-eu-budget-support-to-georgia-moldova-and-ukraine/>

agriculture/food security, mobility of students and professionals) and these areas could be explored in closer cooperation between decision-makers and civil society from the EaP and EU.

2) Embrace, empower and engage civil society

In all EaP countries, the EU should aim to **support reform-minded national actors** who can put pressure or take forward reforms as opposed to those who would want to only superficially simulate such a process. EaP CSF members are at the core of that process in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and continue to call on decision-makers in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus to adopt EU standards and strengthen bilateral cooperation with the EU. The constellation of reform-minded actors and veto-players in each country is decisive for the reform process. In all six countries, the veto-players are stronger and are to be found among the political elites. The reform-minded actors are mostly in civil society and small and medium-sized businesses, although Moldova, Georgia and now Ukraine have seen some of these players join the government in senior roles after elections have brought about a change of government. The EU cannot impose its agenda from outside, but it can tip the balance in favour of the first type of actors, by consistently engaging with them and limiting the space for manoeuvre for the actors resisting the reforms. The veto-players enjoy the broadest space for manoeuvre in situations when the rule of law is weak or absent, and when pluralism and political competition are suppressed. Most recently, reform-minded actors in Ukraine changed the direction of developments in the country. If it were not for the Euromaidan movement that rebelled against the political leadership, Ukraine would not have signed the Association Agreement. In contrast, the reform minded actors in Armenia did not have the same leverage and lacked strong support among opposition political parties to stand against the decision of the president to turn the country towards the EEU⁷.

Support to civil society should manifest itself in forms of capacity building, empowering through awareness raising and explaining the values and benefits of approximation to the EU, monitoring and expert input as well as support to the **establishment of civil dialogue and consultative mechanisms with public authorities at all levels**, which will strengthen society involvement in the governance process. It is crucial to support the development of civil society infrastructure at regional and local level through implementation of consultation processes by public administration **and small global granting schemes** accessible for both public authorities and small local CSOs able to engage citizens in such dialogue. The EU funding for monitoring policy reform should also be supported through global granting/regranting schemes to ensure that EU approximation is participative and community-driven.

⁷ European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership countries 2014, Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, Renaissance International Foundation, Open Society Foundation and PASOS – Policy Association for an Open Society, www.eap-index.eu

Civil society participation in the **bilateral dialogues between EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus**, and adequate feedback to CSOs input should be secured. It has been noted that in some of these countries, while the EU delegation is open to initiatives from civil society, they go along with the host government policy in terms of denying a place to CSOs at the negotiation table. They also “often relied on existing partners, and thus did not involve potentially new partners or organisations that have not yet worked with the EU”⁸. Experience shows that especially pro-EU civil society platforms have played a critical role in upholding governments to their commitments on reform and democratisation.

In the Eastern Partnership countries, where the support of local NGOs by international donors has been virtually suspended due to unfavourable legislation, **EU should find a way to continue supporting reform-minded civil society activists**, respecting national legislation as far as possible.

Bilateral **civil society platforms (CSPs) envisioned under the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine** should become a real channel of influence and a monitoring tool, rather than a bureaucratic exercise. They should be established based on the principles of democracy, a free market and the rule of law, which make up the foundation of the Association Agreement, and must be defended against their enemies be they abroad or among oligarchic interests at home.

3) Improve ownership, engage new actors and build capacity

The EU should put in place an **improved communication plan to demonstrate the benefits of integration with the EU** based on values and tangible potential impact. This communication should involve civil society, hence strengthening ownership of that communication agenda at national, regional and local levels. Co-operation on “modernisation” with the governments needs to be balanced with thematic CSO capacity-building programmes in the areas of promoting freedom of expression, independent media, rule of law and human rights – key pillars to building vibrant democracies in EaP region, as well as in areas where civil society participation has been weak (economic, environmental, energy, and social cooperation). Strong civil society involvement in these areas gains now a particular importance in implementing the AAs.

Implementation of regional and national peer exchange initiatives such as **Opinion Festivals, Europe Awareness Week and other people-to-people initiatives** in education, culture, social and sports fields (including schools, organisations, social and cultural centres and clubs) should be supported. In the pro-EU countries, there is a need to **develop EU-focused**

⁸ EU Delegations’ Engagement with Civil Society Organisations on Geographic Programming 2014-2020, Concord, August 2013, www.concordeurope.org/civil-society/

academic and training programmes for public servants and civil society, especially in those areas covered by AAs where civil society is less experienced compared to other areas (SME, research and innovation, energy efficiency, social policy, etc). The latter is particularly important for an efficient monitoring of AAs by the EaP CSF. Awareness raising programmes with local civil society ownership and regional **exchange dimensions** are a solution to building trust and engagement (ex: CSOs may want to exchange on how to engage seniors, children or youth in discussing EU values).

We think there is a potential to engage society in areas where the political elites drag or simulate reform and lead to society fatigue with talking about technicalities of EU (areas concerned include corruption, transparency, independence of judiciary, selective justice, public procurement, de-monopolisation of economic and financial sectors, SME development, ensuring food security, reform of education system and pressure on NGO activists still happening in EaP countries). In these areas, EU should use the "flexibility" principle and address it through a mix of policy and communication tools, with strong involvement of reform-driving civil society actors. **Regional pilot initiatives** could be implemented in cooperation with actors such as EaP CSF by developing **targeted awareness raising and engagement programmes** in these challenging reform fields where economic interests of ruling elites would directly suffer and hence their motivation is low.

The AAs provide for more regular, intensive and more professional (competent) activity of the CSF than it used to carry out within the framework of the current EaP. According to AAs, the role of CSF becomes more institutionalized. It leads to the evidence that the existing support mechanism for the CSF and its National Platforms, based on short-term projects should be complemented with a long-term institutional support mechanism. In **the context of improving ownership** of the AA implementation, EaP governments should also contribute directly to the institutional support of the CSF, complementing the commitment of the EU and some of its more pro-active Member States. The obligations to facilitate the work of NGOs working for the benefit of society reflected in the AAs will be fulfilled in this way.

Increasing the role of EU Member States in the implementation of the renewed EaP can already build on some successful programmes led through diplomatic and development cooperation structures in the region. Bilateral inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary cooperation **must be opened up to civil society scrutiny**, strengthening public control of governance in EaP countries and motivating the engagement of more actors across the board.

EU political parties could strengthen their capacity building efforts for their EaP counterparts to put in place transparent, democratic electoral systems, engaging membership in party governance rather than validating often personality-based groups that do not reflect value-based politics and undermine the cooperation with the EU.

The EU should also make efforts **to increase the interest of small and medium-sized businesses** in the Eastern Partnership countries in their rapprochement with the European Union. Tens of thousands of small and medium-sized businesses could become allies of rapprochement of the EaP countries with the EU.

4) Introduce a security dimension in the renewed EaP to strengthen country resilience to external pressure

EaP CSF calls on the EU to develop a **hard and soft security dimension** in the future ENP, including looking into CSDP reform, developing tools for dealing with active and frozen conflicts, as well as into soft security reform areas such as energy security, information security, food security, fighting corruption, de-monopolisation, confidence-building measures in conflict areas etc.

Civil society has a role to play in this process, particularly through monitoring and actions in confidence-building that can be complemented with harder incentives such as economic and political cooperation. EaP CSF has developed recommendations⁹ in a policy brief on security in the Eastern Partnership countries and is carrying out a project monitoring Russian propaganda in the EaP countries.

5) Build on the successful elements of the implementation mechanisms and strengthen peer learning and cross-region exchange

The EaP CSF sees the potential of **creating cross-region good practice peer exchange** (examples of successful reform implementation in the Southern Neighbourhood can be shared with the neighbours in the East and vice versa).

For successful sectorial cooperation, the future ENP should democratise some of the closed dialogue spaces, opening them up for public monitoring. Cooperation under some EaP Platforms has evolved into parallel agendas of governments and civil society. It would be crucial to relaunch a more cohesive and participative agenda where all stakeholders engage fully across all platforms.

In the economic field, more focus could be placed on **research and innovation, SME and agricultural development areas**. These areas will likely be of interest to all EaP countries regardless of the degree of their aspiration toward the EU. **Crucial for economic development and cooperation** is to multiply B2B initiatives among SME representatives, trans-border cooperation involving public authorities and civil society at the EU/EaP borders and in regional fora such as the Baltic Sea, Black Sea regions, as well as **to support the**

⁹ EaP CSF Policy Brief on Security, November 2014, http://eap-csf.eu/assets/files/Policy-Brief_en2.pdf

development of economic diplomacy programmes by the EaP countries. Stronger support to **SMEs** through DCFTA implementation in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine will enhance their contribution to national economy and implementation of EU required standards so they can reach the EU market.

The participation of small and medium-sized businesses of EaP countries in relevant EU programs can contribute to the harmonisation of legislation and the increased interest of SMEs in European integration.

EU employers' structures and trade union organisations should be involved to support the development of a **strong social dialogue** and tripartite mechanisms. There is critical lack of understanding and **unreformed old representations of trade unions and employers organisations** that only have a façade of a fundamental pillar of economic and social policy development.

Advancing on key strategic objectives including infrastructure interconnectedness in the energy, transport, finance and business logistics fields by applying EU standards and adapting EU directives should remain a priority. Promoting development of **green and social economy** in the region through flagship initiatives should be one of the highlighted issues on the agenda.

In conclusion, EaP CSF calls on EU and EaP decision-makers to give a new impetus to the agenda, to deliver more concrete results for the population and to engage more clearly civil society in the reform process.

About Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum

The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) is a unique multi-layered regional civil society platform aimed at promoting European integration, facilitating reforms and democratic transformations in the six Eastern Partnership countries - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Serving as a civil society and people-to-people dimension of the Eastern Partnership initiative, the EaP CSF strives to strengthen civil society in the region, boost pluralism in public discourse and policy making by holding governments accountable and by promoting participatory democracy and fundamental freedoms.

For more information, please visit www.eap-csf.eu

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